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THE DARK SIDE OF THE BAKKEN BOOM: PROTECTING
THE IMPORTANCE OF AN OIL AND GAS LEASE’S BONUS
PAYMENT THROUGH A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE
AMELIORATION OF IRISH OIL AND GAS,
INCORPORATED V. RIEMER
ABSTRACT
As the Bakken oil boom matures, North Dakota courts are increasingly
encountering questions concerning the validity of oil and gas leases,
including whether a lessee’s failure to timely tender a paid-up lease’s bonus
constitutes a complete or partial failure of consideration. In Irish Oil and
Gas, Incorporated v. Riemer, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that it
could not rule that a lessee’s failure to timely tender a paid-up lease’s bonus
necessarily constitutes a complete failure of consideration because the
lease’s royalty interest may constitute sufficient consideration. Regardless
of the decision’s legal merits, this holding unfortunately usurps lessorlessee relations by realigning the risks associated with a lease’s execution
and relegates lessors to pursuing inefficient forms of legal recourse that
cannot account for the potential economic cost of the lessee’s conduct. In
order to rectify these and other policy concerns, this article will argue that
North Dakota should adopt a statute that automatically terminates a lease,
without the need for judicial intervention, if a lessee fails to tender a lease’s
bonus within thirty days of the lease’s execution, the lessor subsequently
notifies the lessee, in writing, of such a delinquency, and the lessee fails to
redress the situation within fifteen additional days. To do otherwise
subjects unsophisticated lessors to the mercurial and capricious whims of
sophisticated lessees who speculate about a lease’s value at the lessor’s
expense.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Bakken shale formation is a 200,000 square mile geological region
that encompasses parts of Montana, North Dakota, and Saskatchewan. 1
Scientists estimate that the Bakken contains in excess of 500 billion barrels

1. See generally Toni Tease, The Bakken Boom is Producing Not Only Oil but Also Creative
Juices, 38 MONTANA LAW. 22 (2012). For simplicity’s sake, this article refers to all geographical
formations in western North Dakota as “the Bakken.”
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of oil,2 of which, approximately 4 billion barrels are recoverable with
contemporary technology.3 Amerada Oil first tapped the Bakken’s
potential in 1951,4 and thereafter, North Dakota experienced intermittent
spates of boom and bust development.5 Recent advances in hydraulic
fracking have ushered in a prosperous era of Bakken development as
operators have enjoyed a drilling success rate of 99% in certain parts of the
state.6 This success has propelled North Dakota’s oil production to 931,000
barrels of oil per day,7 and some estimate that North Dakota could produce
1.3 million barrels of oil per day by 2023 and 2 million barrels of oil per
day by 2029.8
Despite this prosperity, the oil industry remains laden with numerous
risks,9 and one must understand the context in which such risks occur in
order to appreciate how these risks threaten lessor interests. In developing
an understanding of these risks, this article begins by exploring how the
various types of promises contained in oil and gas leases relate to the
contractual precept of consideration. As a corollary, the article continues
by examining how a party’s potential breach of the lease in relation to the
consideration supporting the lease may excuse a party from the lease. After
this survey, the article addresses the North Dakota Supreme Court’s
decision in Irish Oil & Gas, Incorporated v. Riemer and how the majority
and dissent’s respective opinions appear to rest on tenuous legal
underpinnings. Notwithstanding these legal issues, the article then
examines how Irish Oil may adversely affect lessor interests and how North
Dakota can go about remedying the problems potentially associated with
Irish Oil. Finally, the article concludes by briefly touching upon various
2. Leonardo Maugeri, Oil: The Next Revolution: The Unprecedented Upsurge of Oil
Production Capacity and What it Means for the World, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFS.,
HARV. KENNEDY SCH., June 2012, at 2.
3. UNIV. OF N.D ENERGY & ENV’T RESEARCH CTR., Bakken Formation Resource
Estimates, available at http://www.undeerc.org/bakken/oilproduction.aspx. Some have concluded
that the Bakken may eventually produce up to 24 billion barrels of oil. See Stephen Moore, The
Weekend Interview with Harold Hamm: How North Dakota Became Saudi Arabia, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 2011, at A13.
4. Owen Anderson, Introduction: North Dakota Energy Landscape, 85 N.D. L. REV. 715,
715 (2010).
5. Id. at 719.
6. See N.D. Indus. Comm’n, Oil and Gas Frequently Asked Questions, pg. 7, available at
www nd.gov/ndic/ogrp/info/g-015-033-faq.pdf.
7. Nick Smith, Oil Drilling Expected to Remain Strong, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 12, 2013,
available
at
http://bismarcktribune.com/bakken/oil-drilling-expected-to-staystrong/article_82ebe8d6-6375-11e3-9aa5-001a4bcf887a html.
8. James Mason, Bakken’s Maximum Potential Oil Production Rate Explored, OIL & GAS J.,
available at http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-4/exploration-development/bakken-smaximum html.
9. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 719-20.
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methods that lessors can employ to adequately protect their interests from
Irish Oil.
A. OIL AND GAS LAW AND CONSIDERATION
From its inception, oil and gas law experienced a peculiar development
because courts and legislatures could not refer to English law in developing
governing doctrines.10 Due to this precedential void, the legal community
struggled to reconcile principles from other subsets of law into governing
axioms,11 and oil and gas law became the product of case-law at its worst.12
Nevertheless, the legal community articulated various black letter rules that
transcended jurisdictional inconsistencies, including the rule that oil and gas
leases are contracts.13 Accordingly, although leases are unique14 and
concern nearly every classification of property interest,15 leases must still
ascribe to basic contracting principles.
Among other requirements to form a legally binding agreement,16
contracting parties must support a contract with sufficient consideration.17
Generally, any benefit that the promisor agrees to confer upon the promisee
may constitute sufficient consideration,18 regardless of whether such
consideration is inadequate given the circumstances.19 Where sufficient
consideration initially validated a contract, a party’s breach of the contract
causes either a complete or partial failure of consideration, each of which
contains its own remedies.20 Courts will excuse a party from a contract
when it experienced a complete failure of consideration,21 which occurs
where a party “failed to perform a substantial part of its obligation so as to

10. Patick H. Martin, Unbundling the Executive Right: A Guide to Interpretation of the
Power to Lease and Develop Oil and Gas Interests, 37 NAT. RES. J. 311, 312 (1997).
11. Id. at 313. For instance, North Dakota recognized that principles governing property law
actually hindered the oil industry’s growth. See Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 1997 ND 31, ¶
12, 559 N.W.2d 841.
12. See Martin, supra note 10, at 312.
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-01 (1943) (“Leasing is a contract . . . .”). Courts, however,
also construe leases to be conveyances of real property. See Petroleum Exchange v. Poynter, 64
N.W.2d 718, 722 (N.D. 1954) (holding that “oil, gas and mineral leases are conveyances of
interests in real property”).
14. Ramsey v. Grizzle, 313 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. App. 2010).
15. Moorer v. Bethlehem Baptist Church, 130 So.2d 367, 371 (Ala. 1961).
16. A valid contract also requires that consenting parties, who are capable of contracting,
execute the agreement for a lawful purpose. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-01-02 (1943).
17. Id.
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-05-01 (1943).
19. Harrington v. Harrington, 365 N.W.2d 552, 555 (N.D. 1985) (“If consideration . . .
exists, courts will generally not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration.”).
20. First Nat. Bank of Belfield v. Burich, 367 N.W.2d 148, 152-53 (N.D. 1985).
21. Check Control, Inc. v. Shepherd, 462 N.W.2d 644, 647 (N.D. 1990).
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defeat the very object of the agreement.”22 Contrastingly, a court will only
award monetary damages in an instance concerning a partial failure of
consideration, which occurs where the party’s failure to perform under the
contract leaves other sufficient consideration to sustain the contract.23 Due
to this differentiation, it is imperative to determine whether a party’s failure
to perform under the contract constituted a complete or partial failure of
consideration. Courts will generally consider such an inquiry based upon
the facts of a given case;24 however, “[i]ssues of fact may become issues of
law for the court if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion
from the facts.”25
Pursuant to these principles, any benefit conferred upon the lessor or
detriment suffered by the lessee may constitute sufficient consideration in
the context of oil and gas leases.26 In exchange for the lessor granting the
lessee the right to develop the lessor’s property, a lessee generally offers
consideration consisting of a bonus, royalty interests, and delay rental
payments.27 Courts consider the lease’s royalty interest the lease’s primary
consideration28 so that a covenant to develop the property along with a
promise to pay royalties if production occurs from such development
constitutes sufficient consideration.29 However, lessees generally contract
around this covenant of development by using drilling-delay rental clauses,
which obviate any such covenant by “giving the lessee the right to maintain
the lease . . . by paying delay rentals instead of starting drilling
operations.”30 Such a combination constitutes sufficient consideration
because the lessee is either obligated to pay royalties if development occurs
or pay delay rentals if development has yet to occur on the property.31
Although the exchange of this consideration constitutes sufficient

22. Id.
23. Id. Although the determination as to what constitutes a “substantial” failure to perform
will be predicated upon the particularities of the given situation, one can discern the nature of a
“substantial” breach by recognizing the distinction between a complete and partial failure of
consideration. Since a partial failure of consideration occurs only where the breach of contract
leaves sufficient consideration to sustain the contract, it stands to reason that a breach of contract
is “substantial” where such breach leaves no other sufficient consideration to sustain the contract
because such a situation would preclude a breach of contract from being classified as a partial
failure of consideration.
24. Id. at 647.
25. Groleau v. Bjornson Oil Co., Inc., 2004 ND 55, ¶ 6, 676 N.W.2d 763, 767.
26. See 38 AM. JUR. 2d Gas & Oil § 25 (1968).
27. 19A MICH. CIV. JUR. Oil & Natural Gas § 32 (2014).
28. 3A SUMMERS OIL & GAS § 31:1 (3d ed. 2012).
29. 58 C.J.S. Mines & Minerals § 280 (2009); 38 AM. JUR. 2d Gas & Oil § 25 (1968).
30. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (9th ed. 2009).
31. 12 B.E. WITKIN ET AL, Summary of Cal. Law § 799(2) (10th ed. 2000).
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consideration, lessees also offer bonus payments, which are commonly
referred to as “signing bonuses.”
B. BONUS PAYMENTS AS CONSIDERATION
As competition for sought-after property increased, lessees began
utilizing a one-time bonus payment to differentiate themselves from other
lessees in attempting to induce the lessor to execute a lease in the lessee’s
favor.32 As such, a bonus is the consideration for the lessor’s execution of
the lease33 that provides the lessor with a speculative inducement to enter
the lease insofar as the lessee will be able to collect additional royalties if
production occurs on the property.34 The amount a lessee is willing to pay
as a bonus is contingent upon the perceived value of the lessor’s property,
whether the lessor’s property is located in proven production areas, and tax
consequences.35 Because these circumstances are localized, lessees have
paid bonuses from $5 per acre in West Virginia to $20,000 per acre in
Texas.36 Despite the fact that the bonus induces the lessor to execute a
lease and the lessee is generally under no obligation to develop the property
so as to provide royalties,37 some lessees have unfortunately offered
bonuses with little or no intention of tendering such payments, unless it is
financially prudent to do so.
Due to the oil industry’s speculative nature, some lessees refuse to
tender a lease’s bonus if market fluctuations or exploratory drilling render
the lessor’s property worthless. For instance, lessors allege that Range
Resources unjustly speculated about potential market fluctuations and
refused to pay deferred lease bonuses after market prices suddenly slumped
in 2010.38 In North Dakota, lessees have refused to tender a bonus’s
outstanding balance because the lessee failed to find a buyer for the lease

32. 3A SUMMERS OIL & GAS § 31:1 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining that, “[a]s competition among
lessees became keener, [lessees] instituted the practice of bidding against each other by offering
the lessor a cash bonus for the lease . . . .).
33. Antelope Prod. Co. v. Shrines Hosp. for Crippled Children, 464 N.W.2d 159, 161 (Neb.
1991).
34. Burlew v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 940 N.Y.S.2d 781, 787 (N.Y. 2011).
35. Ronald D. Nickum, Negotiating and Drafting a Modern Lease on Behalf of Lessor, 13
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1982).
36. See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNCONVENTIONAL GAS SHALES:
DEVELOPMENT,
TECHNOLOGY,
&
POLICY
ISSUES,
(2009)
available
at
http://www fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40894.pdf.
37. See generally Kendor P. Jones & Jennifer L. McDowell, Keeping Your Lease Alive in
Good Times and in Bad, 55 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 23-1, § 23.02 (2009).
38. See generally Backwater Props., LLC v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 1:10CV103,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48496 (D. W.Va. May 5, 2011); Valentino v. Range Res.-Appalachia,
LLC, No. 09-1615, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50692 (D. Pa. May 21, 2010).
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after market conditions deteriorated.39 More recently, lessees have begun
testing the Bakken’s outermost peripheries, and Chesapeake Energy
cancelled multiple leases and refused to tender deferred lease bonuses after
drilling six exploratory wells in southwestern North Dakota in 2012.40
Analogously, Chesapeake cancelled hundreds of leases and refused to
tender deferred lease bonuses after encountering dry exploratory wells in
northern Michigan.41 Although these examples are atypical within the oil
industry,42 such examples illustrate that, despite statutory protections,
lessors still fall victim to unscrupulous lessees who speculate about a
lease’s profitability by withholding lease bonuses.
II. IRISH OIL AND GAS, INCORPORATED V. RIEMER
In spite of the questionable nature of the lessees’ conduct in these
situations, the lessors could take some solace in the fact that the lessees
cancelled the leases so that the lessors could re-lease the properties.43 But
what happens when a lessee fails to tender a bonus in a timely fashion and
refuses to discharge the lease? The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed
this situation in Irish Oil and Gas, Incorporated v. Riemer.44
In Irish Oil, the Riemers executed paid-up leases with Irish Oil that
contained royalty interests and bonuses that were payable within sixty days
of the leases’ executions.45 Irish Oil failed to pay the bonuses within the
prescribed time periods,46 and the Riemers re-leased the property to another
lessee.47 Irish Oil, who later attempted to tender the bonuses,48 sued the
Riemers for breaching the leases, and the district court concluded that Irish
Oil’s failure to promptly pay the bonuses constituted a complete failure of
consideration because reasonable minds could not differ that Irish Oil’s
failure to timely tender the bonuses constituted a substantial breach of the
39. Johnson v. Mineral Estate, Inc., 371 N.W.2d 136, 139-40 (N.D. 1985); Nantt v. Puckett
Energy, Co., 382 N.W.2d 655, 656-59 (N.D. 1986).
40. Lauren Donovan, Chesapeake Energy Pulling Back, Won’t Honor Lease Agreements,
BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 7, 2012, available at http://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-andregional/chesapeake-energy-pulling-back-won-t-honor-lease-agreements/article_89324038-521411e1-ba31-0019bb2963f4 html.
41. Joshua Schneyer & Brian Grow, Energy Giant Hid Behind Shells in “Land Grab,”
REUTERS, Dec. 28, 2011, http://www reuters.com/article/2011/12/28/us-energy-giant-newsproidUSTRE7BR0HS20111228.
42. Donovan, supra note 40.
43. As will be discussed in forthcoming sections, this ability may be meaningless because
market conditions may have rendered the lessor’s property worthless.
44. 2011 ND 22, 794 N.W.2d at 715.
45. Irish Oil, ¶ 2, 794 N.W.2d at 716.
46. Id. ¶ 4, 794 N.W.2d at 717.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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leases.49 Accordingly, the district court excused the Riemers from the
leases,50 and Irish Oil appealed under the contention that its failure to timely
tender the bonuses was only a partial failure of consideration.51
A. MAJORITY’S HOLDING
The North Dakota Supreme Court refused to find that Irish Oil’s failure
to timely pay the bonuses constituted a complete failure of consideration as
a matter of law.52 To do so would tacitly conclude that the leases’ royalty
interests were immaterial under the leases.53 Such a conclusion would
contrast a litany of cases finding that the royalty interest was the lease’s
primary consideration54 and North Dakota Century Code section 47-1639.1,55 which provides that prospective royalties are the essence of the
lease.56 Moreover, the court found that prospective royalties could
constitute executory consideration,57 irrespective of the uncertainty that no
royalties may eventuate.58 Accordingly, the district court erred in holding
that Irish Oil’s failure to tender the bonuses converted an issue of fact into
one of law because a royalty interest may constitute sufficient
consideration.59 Because the query of whether a royalty interest constituted
sufficient consideration remained an issue of fact60 and there was
insufficient information to determine whether the Riemers ascribed enough
importance to the royalty interests for such interests to constitute sufficient
consideration,61 the court remanded the case for further fact-finding.62
B. CHIEF JUSTICE VANDEWALLE’S DISSENT
In dissent, Chief Justice VandeWalle, joined by Justice Sandstrom,
concluded that Irish Oil’s failure to promptly pay the leases’ bonuses

49. Id. ¶ 9, 794 N.W.2d at 718.
50. Id.
51. Id. ¶ 10.
52. Id. ¶ 25, 794 N.W.2d at 721-22. With this conclusion, the court implied that reasonable
minds could draw multiple inferences from the facts presented in Irish Oil.
53. Id. ¶ 24, 794 N.W.2d at 721.
54. Id. ¶ 22.
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.1 (2013).
56. Irish Oil, ¶ 25, 794 N.W.2d at 721-22.
57. Id. ¶ 26, 794 N.W.2d at 722. “[C]onsideration may be executed or executory in whole
or in part.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-05-05 (2013).
58. Irish Oil, ¶ 26, 794 N.W.2d at 722.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id. ¶ 25, 794 N.W.2d at 721-22.
62. Id.
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constituted a complete failure of consideration as a matter of law.63 The
Chief Justice opined that reasonable minds could not differ that paying the
bonuses was a substantial part of Irish Oil’s obligations because the bonuses
were the inducement in the leases’ executions64 and the fact that Irish Oil
was under no obligation to develop the Riemers’ property indicated that any
future royalty was purely speculative.65 Additionally, in a foreshadowing
of the aforesaid Chesapeake Energy situation,66 the Chief Justice expressed
his concern that the majority’s holding could allow a lessee to drill on the
lessor’s property and tender the lease’s bonus only if the drilling results
made such an action advisable.67 In this instance, the lessee could argue
that the delinquent bonus was inconsequential because the royalty interest
constituted sufficient consideration.68 However, if the lessee found the
lessor’s property unsuitable for production, or if the lessee was unable to
profitably peddle the lease, the lessee could terminate the lease without
tendering the bonus, which would relegate lessors to seeking statutorily
afforded damages while holding a property possessing no speculative
value.69 Because of these consternating potentialities and the fact that Irish
Oil’s failure to timely tender the leases’ bonuses constituted a complete
failure of consideration, the Chief Justice would have affirmed the appeal
and excused the Riemers from the leases with Irish Oil.70
III. IRISH OIL’S AFTERMATH
Irrespective of whether the court correctly concluded that a failure to
tender a paid-up lease’s bonus does not necessarily constitute a complete
failure of consideration, Irish Oil offends public policy in numerous
respects. The decision is a disservice to lessors who have fallen victim to
perfidious lessees because the decision absolves the consequences of
impermissible speculative conduct. Moreover, the decision leaves lessors
to seek inefficient and insufficient forms of legal redress. The amalgamated
effect of these issues requires legislative action to protect lessor interests
from duplicitously speculating lessees.

63. Id. ¶ 55, 794 N.W.2d at 729-30 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting).
64. Id. ¶ 58, 794 N.W.2d at 730 (citing Elsinore Oil Co. v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 40 P.2d
523, 523–24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935)).
65. Id. ¶ 60, 794 N.W.2d at 731.
66. See discussion, supra Part I.B.
67. Irish Oil, ¶ 62, 794 N.W.2d at 731 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting).
68. See id. ¶ 61.
69. Id.
70. Id. ¶ 66, 794 N.W.2d at 732.
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A. LEGAL CORRECTNESS
Based upon the facts presented by Irish Oil, both the majority and the
dissent erred in determining whether or how Irish Oil’s failure to timely
tender the paid-up leases’ bonus payments constituted a complete or partial
failure of consideration. Specifically, the majority conflated the concepts of
primary and sufficient consideration in determining that a royalty interest
may prevent a failure to tender a paid-up lease’s bonus from constituting a
complete failure of consideration. Similarly, the dissent improperly focused
upon the importance of the bonus as the consideration inducing the lessor’s
execution of a lease rather than the peculiar role that a bonus plays in
sustaining a paid-up lease. These positions should have recognized that,
without a paid-up lease’s bonus, no sufficient consideration supports a
paid-up lease because a royalty interest cannot independently constitute
sufficient consideration. Consequentially, Irish Oil’s failure to timely
tender the paid-up leases’ bonuses constituted a complete failure of
consideration because this breach left no sufficient consideration to support
the leases.71
Before proceeding, it must be noted that this article assumes
consideration is necessary in a lease. However, as one treatise notes, “[t]he
question of whether consideration is required for an oil and gas lease has
been the subject of some dispute” due to disagreement about whether leases
are contracts or conveyances.72
Where courts construe leases as
conveyances, no consideration is required; where courts construe leases as
contracts, consideration is required.73 Precedent implies that North Dakota
ascribes to the latter of these positions.74 Whether this precedent is correct
given that “oil, gas and mineral leases are conveyances of interests in real
property”75 is beyond the scope of this article. Accordingly, this analysis
assumes that consideration is necessary for the execution and sustainment
of a lease.

71. The forthcoming analysis rests on the court’s apparent assumption that no other type of
consideration supported the implicated paid-up leases aside from the bonuses and prospective
royalties.
72. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW,
§ 220 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2013).
73. Id.
74. See generally AHO v. Maragos, 2000 ND 14, 605 N.W.2d 161 (oral contract to grant
lease in exchange for dismissal of claims for damages enforced by court).
75. Petroleum Exchange v. Poynter, 64 N.W.2d 718, 722 (N.D. 1954).
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1. Peculiarity of Paid-Up Leases
In order to properly contextualize the issue, one must briefly examine
the role consideration serves in contractual formations. Under North
Dakota law, a contract “must impose an obligation upon each of the parties
to do something or to permit something to be done as consideration for the
act or promise of the other” because “mutuality of obligation is an essential
element of a valid contract.”76 “Without this mutuality of obligation, the
agreement lacks consideration and no enforceable contract has been created.
Or, if one of the promises leaves a party free to perform or to withdraw
from the agreement at his own unrestricted pleasure, the promise is deemed
illusory and it provides no consideration.”77 Accordingly, in order for a
valid contract to exist, the agreement must bind each contracting party in
some respect.
Such principles laid the foundation for the previous discussion
concerning the roles that various forms of consideration serve in oil and gas
leases.78 Lessees historically supported a lease with a royalty interest and a
covenant to develop the lessor’s property within a specific time frame;79
since the lessee was obligated to develop the property, this promise
constituted sufficient consideration.80 Lessees generally contract around
this obligation by using drilling-delay rental clauses, which discharge any
covenant of development by requiring the lessee to pay delay rentals if
drilling has yet to occur on the property.81 Although these delay rentals are
typically nominal, the rentals constitute consideration because the lessee is
bound to pay the rental payments where the lessee chooses not to develop
the leased property.
Because the delay rentals effectively supplant the role typically served
by covenants of development, such payments are critical in determining
whether sufficient consideration, and thereby mutual obligation, exists in a
lease. Where lessees employ a drilling-delay rental clause, the lease must
obligate the lessee to pay the delay rentals because courts have invalidated
leases that do not require the lessee to produce minerals or make payments
in lieu of production.82 The lack of mutuality in leases solely supported by

76. Stewart Equip. Co. v. Hilling Const. Co, 175 N.W.2d 692, 696 (N.D. 1970).
77. Mattei v. Hooper, 330 P.2d 625, 626 (Cal. 1958).
78. See discussion supra Part I.A.
79. 58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 280 (2009).
80. Id.
81. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (9th ed. 2009).
82. ICG Natural Res. LLC v. BPI Energy, Inc., 926 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ill. Ct. App. 2010)
(explaining that “[w]e recognize and adhere to the long-standing precedent in Illinois that royalty
leases are void.”).
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a promise to pay royalties if the lessee chooses to develop the lessor’s
property, which courts have dubbed “royalty leases,”83 mandates that courts
invalidate the lease because such leases “would allow the lessee to do
absolutely nothing with the leases” while the lessor remained bound by the
lease.84 If courts were to do otherwise, the lessor’s “hands would be tied up
so that he could not engage in other enterprises of a permanent character,
but must ever stand with his hands folded, awaiting the pleasure of [the
lessee]. In such a contract as this[,] there is neither reciprocity, fairness[,]
nor good conscience.”85 Thus, where the lease imposes no obligation to
develop the lessor’s property, the delay rentals are pivotal in maintaining
the lease because such payments provide mutuality of obligation to the
lease.
Based upon these principles, the royalty interest is largely
inconsequential in determining whether sufficient consideration supports a
lease. This immateriality emanates from the fact that any royalty payment
will come to fruition only where the lessee chooses to develop the property.
In this respect, it is immaterial that the royalties constitute the primary
inducement for the lessor’s execution of the lease86 because the decision as
to whether to develop the property is otherwise solely within the lessee’s
prerogative. As outlined above, this is precisely the type of illusory
promise that cannot constitute sufficient consideration because such a
promise “leaves a party free to perform [under] the agreement at his own
unrestricted pleasure.”87 As one court succinctly stated, if the consideration
“to be paid the lessor depends upon the profit to result from the
development . . . and the lessee is not bound, either expressly or impliedly,
to explore and discover, or, when discovered, to work such mine, then no
consideration for the lease exists.”88 Accordingly, where the lessee is under
no obligation to develop the lessor’s property, the royalty interest cannot
83. Id. at 450.
84. Id.
85. Lear v. Choteau, 23 Ill. 39 (Ill. 1859).
86. Cheyenne Mining and Uranium Co. v. Fed. Res. Corp., 694 P.2d 65, 74 (Wyo. 1985)
(explaining that the primary consideration in [an oil and gas lease] is the royalty derived from the
development of the resources).
87. Mattei v. Hooper, 330 P.2d 625, 626 (Cal. 1958).
88. Petroleum Co. v. Cole, Coke & Mfg. Co, 18 S.W. 65, 66 (Tenn. 1890). In this respect,
the majority may have also been misguided in its conclusion that a royalty interest without a
covenant of development may constitute executory consideration pursuant to N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 9-05-05. A promise, act, or forbearance constitutes executory consideration only where the
party is under an affirmative obligation to tender such consideration. See Blarin Eng’g Co. v.
Page Steel & Wire Co., 288 F. 662, 664 (3d Cir. 1923). Since the drilling-delay rental clause
imposes no covenant of development, the royalty interest cannot constitute executory
consideration because the lack of a covenant of development means that the lessee is not obligated
to tender such consideration.
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constitute sufficient consideration because the contract suffers from a want
of mutual obligation. As outlined above, lessees typically provide this
mutual obligation by using delay rentals to contract around any covenant to
develop the lessor’s property.
The principles associated with these delay rentals have a peculiar
application within “paid-up leases.” With paid-up leases, the lessee pays all
of the delay rentals that the lessee would otherwise pay throughout the
lease’s primary term in one consolidated payment that “is included as a part
of the bonus tendered to the lessor upon execution of the lease.”89
Consequentially, the “bonus payment, not rentals, maintains [a paid-up]
lease during the primary term” where there lessee is under no covenant of
development.90 Where the lessee refuses to pay the paid-up lease’s bonus,
the lessee also refuses to tender the lease’s delay rentals, which leaves a
royalty interest supporting the lease through the lease’s primary term.
However, this royalty interest is unaccompanied by any obligation to
develop the lessor’s property because the inclusion of a drilling-delay rental
clause expressly disclaims any such obligation, thereby preventing the
judicial imposition of any type of implied covenant of development.91
Based upon these principles, a failure to pay paid-up lease’s bonus
payment would leave no other sufficient consideration supporting the lease
because, as seen above, a royalty interest cannot solely support a lease
without any other form of consideration. Since a partial failure of
consideration occurs only where a breach of contract leaves other sufficient
consideration to support the lease,92 the failure to tender a paid-up lease’s
bonus payment constitutes a complete failure of consideration because no
consideration exists where a lease is solely supported by a royalty interest
and the lessee is not bound, whether implicitly or explicitly, to develop the
lessor’s property. Thus, the bonus is of the utmost importance in paid-up
leases because the bonus is necessary to sustain a lease without a covenant
of development.

89. 6 MS PRAC. ENCYCLOPEDIA MS LAW § 53:8 (emphasis added).
90. EnerQuest Oil & Gas, LLC, v. Plains Exploration & Prod. Co., No. SA:12-CV-542DAE, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 5951952 at 21 (D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2013).
91. Bodcaw Oil Co. v. Atl. Ref. Co., 228 S.W.2d 626, 634 (Ark. 1950). In order to avoid
terminating such leases due to a want of consideration, courts read implied covenants of
development into leases that solely supported by a promise to pay a royalty interest if the lessee
chooses to develop the property. See W.M. Moldoff, Annotation, Implied Obligation of
Purchaser or Lessee to Conduct Search for, or to Develop of Work Premises for, Minerals Other
than Oil and Gas, 76 A.L.R.2d 721 (1961). Where the court finds this implied covenant, the
covenant “must be performed in order to keep such a lease in existence and to avoid its
forfeiture.” Manfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 133 S.W. 837, 839 (Ark. 1911).
92. See Check Control, Inc. v. Shepherd, 462 N.W.2d 644, 647 (N.D. 1990).
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2. Majority’s Position
With this conclusion in mind, one can begin to see how the legal
principles underlying the majority’s position in Irish Oil begin to falter.
From the outset, it is imperative to note that Irish Oil concerned paid-up
leases that contained no covenant of development93 or “unless” clauses.94
As such, Irish Oil exchanged delay rentals to disclaim any covenant,
whether expressed or implied, to develop the Riemers’ property. However,
because the implicated leases were paid-up leases, all of the delay rentals
that Irish Oil used to contract around the obligation to develop the Riemers’
property were subsumed within the leases’ bonuses. Accordingly, in
addition to failing to pay the leases’ bonuses, Irish Oil failed to tender the
leases’ delay rentals when Irish Oil failed to tender the leases’ bonuses,
which left the royalty interest, without any obligation to develop the
Riemers’ property, independently supporting the leases.
Notwithstanding this realization and the importance of the bonus in
sustaining a paid-up lease, the Irish Oil majority still found that Irish Oil’s
failure to timely tender the lease bonuses merely amounted to a partial
failure of consideration. Such a conclusion may be improper because, as
noted above, the royalty interest cannot solely support a lease where the
lessee is under no obligation to develop the property or pay delay rentals
because the lessee is under no obligation to act under such an
arrangement.95 After discounting the obligation to pay the bonus after Irish
Oil breached the lease from the consideration supporting the lease, Irish
Oil’s lease with the Riemers effectively became a judicially proscribed
“royalty lease” in the sense that the only way Irish Oil was bound to act
under the lease was to pay royalties if Irish Oil chose to develop the

93. See Irish Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 22, 794 N.W.2d 715, 721 (The
implicated leases were “‘Paid–Up Lease(s)’ which provide the lessee has no obligation to
commence operations during the primary term . . . .”) (alteration in original).
94. “The leases in Irish Oil did not contain ‘unless’ clauses . . . .” Beaudoin v. JB Mineral
Services, LLC, 2011 ND 229, ¶ 12, 808 N.W.2d 672, 674. The lack of the unless clause is crucial
because:
[w]here a lease contains a recital of an initial cash consideration, even though the
amount is nominal, but provides that if the lessee does not drill within the time named,
the lease will be void, unless the lessee pays a stipulated sum in advance for its further
continuance (the unless drilling clause), then, although the lessee is under no duty to
drill or pay, the courts have held that the lease is not void for want of consideration on
the ground that the nominal initial cash consideration supports the entire lease.
2 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL & GAS § 13:8 (3d ed. 2013). Accordingly, if the leases
contained an unless clause, the forthcoming analysis would be moot because the mere recital of
nominal consideration would have supported the entire lease.
95. See ICG Natural Resources, LLC v. BPI Energy, Inc., 926 N.E.2d 446, 451 (Ill. Ct. App.
2010) (A lease that provided a royalty interest with no obligation to develop the property of tender
delay rentals held invalid).
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Riemers’ property. This optionality, absent other obligations, is precisely
why a royalty interest cannot solely support a lease because the Riemers
remained bound under the lease while Irish Oil’s performance under the
lease was at its own discretion. Accordingly, Irish Oil’s failure to tender
the paid leases’ bonuses amounted to a complete failure of consideration
because a royalty interest cannot constitute sufficient consideration and a
partial failure of consideration only occurs where the Irish Oil’s breach of
the lease left other sufficient consideration to sustain the lease.96
Therefore, although the royalty interest is the primary consideration in
leases, the majority erred by underappreciating how crucial a bonus is
within paid-up leases because the bonus is necessary to sustain a paid-up
lease. In this regard, Irish Oil was incorrectly decided.
3. Dissent’s Position
Pursuant to the conclusion that Irish Oil’s failure to tender the paid-up
leases’ bonus payments constituted a complete failure of consideration, one
would expect that the dissent correctly resolved Irish Oil. The dissent
correctly emphasized that the bonus was material to the disposition of Irish
Oil because of the uncertainty that any royalties would ever eventuate from
production. In this respect, the dissent rightly echoed the forgoing analysis
to the extent that the uncertainties of potential development of the leased
property preclude a royalty interest from constituting sufficient
consideration. In spite of this realization, the dissent misinterpreted the
relationship between such uncertainty and the role that the bonus serves
within the context of paid-up leases.
Particularly, the dissent erred when it seemingly implied that a lessee’s
failure to tender a lease’s bonus necessarily constitutes a complete failure of
consideration. The dissent argued that the failure to tender the bonus
constituted a complete failure of consideration because the bonus serves as
the consideration for the lessor’s execution of the lease.97 Such a
conclusion is not in and of itself incorrect, but the conclusion is erroneous
given that the dissent came to the conclusion without once referencing the
unique role that a bonus plays in a paid-up lease. As will be seen, merely
failing to tender the bonus payment does not necessarily constitute a
complete failure of consideration.

96. See Check Control, 462 N.W.2d at 647.
97. Irish Oil and Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶¶ 56-58, 794 N.W.2d 715, 729-30
(VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting).

694

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89:679

As previously alluded to, lessees typically utilize bonus payments
where competition amongst lessees so dictates.98 Where this competition is
absent, it may not be necessary for the lessee to offer a bonus to induce the
lessor to execute the lease. Alternatively, a lessor may choose to forgo a
bonus payment in exchange for a larger royalty interest or other
consideration. Moreover, a lease can simply stipulate that the lessee pay the
lease’s delay rentals on the lease’s anniversary instead of with the bonus,
which was popular with leases of yesteryear. In these instances, a lease
may not even contain a bonus payment,99 which indicates that other
sufficient consideration otherwise supports the lease. For instance and as
described above,100 a royalty interest coupled with either a covenant of
development or drilling-delay rental clause may constitute sufficient
consideration because the lessee is bound to act in any eventuality. This
mutuality of obligation, which is independent from the bonus payment,
thusly removes a failure to pay a bonus from a complete failure of
consideration because, even after discounting the obligation to pay the
bonus from the lease’s consideration, other sufficient consideration would
still support the lease after the lessee breached the lease. The existence of
this additional consideration would consequentially only entitle the lessor to
commensurate monetary damages.101
Pursuant to these hypotheticals, the dissent’s reasoning in regards to
why Irish Oil’s failure to tender the paid-up leases’ bonuses was improper.
As indicated above, where the bonus merely serves as consideration for the
lease’s execution, a failure to pay the bonus would only constitute a partial
failure of consideration because other sufficient consideration would still
exist notwithstanding a failure to pay the bonus. The reason that the failure
to pay the bonus became of consequence in Irish Oil was because the
paid-up nature of the leases indicated that bonuses contained the leases’
delay rentals. For if the delay rentals had been parsed out from the bonus
instead of subsumed within the bonus, Irish Oil’s failure to tender the bonus
would have been a partial failure of consideration because the delay rentals
would still have furnished mutuality of obligation to the lease.
Accordingly, the dissent came to the correct conclusion through the
fortuitous occurrence of having the implicated leases be paid-up in nature.

98. See discussion supra Part I.B.
99. See Olson v. Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33, 34 (N.D. 1984) (observing that “[t]he sole
consideration for this lease was either delay rentals or a one-eighth royalty from production.”).
100. See discussion supra Part I.B.
101. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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4. Conclusion
Based upon this reasoning, both the majority and the dissent incorrectly
addressed the dispositive facts presented in Irish Oil. The majority erred by
implying that a royalty interest may constitute sufficient consideration so
that a failure to pay a paid-up lease’s bonus would merely constitute a
partial failure of consideration. Similarly, the dissent’s focus on the bonus
as the consideration for the execution of the lease rather than the bonus’s
imperative role in paid-up leases was misguided because a failure to tender
a lease’s bonus does not necessarily constitute a complete failure of
consideration, as the dissent seemingly implied. These positions should
have found that, where a lessee fails to tender the paid-up lease’s bonus,
such failure constitutes a complete failure of consideration because the
lessee’s failure to tender such a payment is a substantial breach of the lease
in the sense that such breach leaves no other sufficient consideration to
support the lease. Accordingly, both positions underappreciated the role
that a bonus payment serves in paid-up leases.
B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Regardless of whether the foregoing analysis is correct, Irish Oil
frustrates various policy concerns at the expense of prejudicing
unsophisticated lessees. North Dakota must abrogate Irish Oil because the
decision potentially unsettles lessor-lessee relations and leaves lessors to
pursue inefficient forms of recourse that cannot account for the potential
economic cost of the lessee’s conduct. Placating such concerns is solely
within the Legislature’s prerogative because the proprieties of the laws
creating these consternating results are questions for the Legislature.102
1. Skewing Lessor-Lessee Relations in Favor of the Lessee
North Dakota must nullify Irish Oil because the decision usurps the
lessor-lessee relational dichotomy by allowing a lessee to enter a lease
without assuming the risks typically associated with a lease’s execution.
North Dakota would be woefully remiss if it allowed recent successes to
cloud the state’s perception about the oil industry’s stability. As the state
knows all too well from good times gone bust,103 the oil industry is highly
speculative104 because the industry is subject to the ebbs and flows of

102. See Mont.-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414, 420 (N.D. 1967).
103. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 719-20.
104. Moerman v. Prairie Rose Res., Inc. 308 P.3d 75, 79 (Mont. 2013).
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numerous forces,105 the amalgam of which leaves market conditions in a
seemingly perpetual state of oscillation.106 Due to this constant state of flux
and the fact a lease commits both of the leasing parties to a long-term
obligation containing a fixed valuation,107 both of the leasing parties assume
a great deal of potential risk and reward in leasing.
Following the lease’s execution, the lessor and lessee maintain an
inverse relationship regarding the lease’s fair market value because the
parties assume the risk that one party will benefit from market fluctuations
at the other’s expense. In such a relationship, the lessor assumes the risk
that the property’s value will appreciate so that the property is more
valuable than what the parties originally anticipated.108 Conversely, the
lessee assumes the risk that the property’s value will depreciate so that the
property is less valuable than what the parties originally anticipated.
Accordingly, in any eventuality, market fluctuations will benefit one party
while prejudicing the other because either the lessor will have leased the
property for less than the property’s current worth or the lessee will have
leased the property for more than the property’s current worth.
In entering the lease and assuming such risks, the lessee may speculate
about how market fluctuations may affect the lease’s value so long as the
lessee is in compliance with the lease’s terms and covenants.109 Regardless
of its unsavory connotations, speculation is a necessity in the oil industry
because the industry’s volatility implicitly imputes some level of
speculation into most oil contracts.110 Moreover, speculation is generally
an integral component of properly allocating resources because speculation
regulates market conditions111 and encourages timely and orderly

105. As one commentator concluded, “[i]t is the long delay between an increase in demand
for oil and gas, an increase in production and exploration activity, and an expansion of the whole
supply chain, which explain the deep cyclicality of the petroleum industry and mining.” John
Kemp, Oil Industry Starts to Squeeze Costs, Wages, FARGO FORUM, January 30, 2014, available
at
https://secure forumcomm.com/?publisher_ID=1&article_id=425101&CFID=425828693&CFTO
KEN=47453689.
106. See Tim McMahon, Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table), INFLATIONDATA.COM,
http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp.
107. Gary Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of Oil and Gas Law,
33 WASHBURN L.J. 670, 718 (1994).
108. Id.
109. This type of speculation before entering the lease permissible, as sharply contrasted
from speculation after entering the lease.
110. See Sinclair Prarie Oil Co. v. Worcester, 205 P.2d 942, 943 (Kan. 1949) (rejecting the
argument that an oil and gas contract of a speculative nature should be struck down as an unlawful
gambling contract because to do so, the court “would have to strike down half the contracts in the
oil business.”).
111. See Conine, supra note 107, at 718.
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development.112 In spite of speculation’s efficacy and necessity in these
regards, courts widely condemn the speculative holding of leases,113
especially in instances concerning certain speculative acts.
With the recognition that protecting lessor interests is of the paramount
importance,114 a lessee may not “speculate with the assets of another
without the payment of any consideration.”115 Courts predicate this concise
aphorism upon the fact that it would be wholly inequitable to allow a lessee
to speculatively lease a property through no expenditure because such an
arrangement exposes the lessee to no risk and allows the lessee to reap the
lease’s rewards.116 Pursuant to this principle, lessees may not hold a lease
for speculative purposes except in strict compliance with the lease and for
consideration other than prospective royalties.117
Equity demands
termination of the lease where no such consideration exists118 or where such
other consideration is delinquent because judicial termination will inflict no
injustice119 and lessors deserve more protections than simply the right to sue
for delinquent consideration.120
Irish Oil contravenes these principles in numerous respects. The
decision unjustly allows a lessee to refrain from tendering the bonus until it
is economically judicious to do so under the pretense that such a
delinquency was inconsequential because the royalty interest constituted
sufficient consideration; if these market conditions never come to fruition,
the lessee can dishonor the lease without the loss of the lease’s required
bonus. Such an unpalatable result that clemencies the untimely tendering of
a lease’s bonus in favor of lessees only exacerbates the lessee’s decided

112. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More is Not Always Better Than Less: An Exploration in
Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 694 (2008).
113. Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Texas Co., 137 P.2d 934, 936 (Okla. 1943).
114. Moerman v. Prairie Rose Res., Inc., 308 P.2d 75, 79 (Mont. 2013) (quoting Stanolind
Oil & Gas, Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F.2d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1938)).
115. See Boyer v. Tucker & Baumgardner Corp., 372 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985) (rejecting a lease interpretation that would have allowed such a result).
116. See generally id.
117. Rice v. Lee, 113 P.2d 235, 236-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).
118. Hall v. Augur, 256 P. 232, 234-235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927) (explaining that a lessor
cannot omit to drill and develop and hold the grant for speculative purposes purely when no other
consideration supports the lease).
119. Alford v. Dennis, 170 P. 1005, 1007 (1918) (stating “[u]nless the defendants had a
bona fide intention to prospect and develop this tract they had no proper purpose in leasing it, and
to cancel the lease will do them no injury.”).
120. Boyer v. Tucker & Baumgardner Corp., 372 N.W.2d 555, 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)
(explaining “[since the oil industry] is so highly speculative, plaintiffs deserve more . . . protection
than merely the right to sue on an obligation.”) (emphasis added).
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advantages in sophistication and bargaining power121 by allowing the lessee
to lease with little to no risk while the lessor still assumes the risks
otherwise associated with the lease’s execution. One can hardly argue that
such a result comports with the Legislature’s previous efforts in other
contexts of trying to “equalize the bargaining power of the landowners
when dealing with major oil companies”122 because Irish Oil may allow
lessees to speculate with the lessor’s assets without the paying of any
consideration, which other courts resoundingly condemn. 123
These
unnerving potentialities stand starkly in contrast to the adage that lessor
interests must remain of the utmost importance,124 and Irish Oil is
unfortunately anything but a singular judicial aberration.
As Irish Oil and numerous other analogous cases indicate, legal
technicalities have prevented courts from adequately protecting lessors from
the unsavory conduct of much more sophisticated lessees.125 Because the
proprieties of the laws creating these technicalities are policy questions for
the Legislature,126 North Dakota must act to protect lessor interests by
requiring the timely tendering of lease bonuses. And time is of the essence
in doing as much because lessees have already attempted to use Irish Oil to
excuse delinquent bonuses at a lessor’s expense.127
2. Lessor’s Lack of Efficient Legal Recourse
North Dakota must also amend its statutory scheme to require the
timely tendering of lease bonuses because the state’s existing statutory
scheme relegates lessors to pursuing inefficient forms of recourse that
cannot account for the true economic cost of the lessee’s conduct. When
considering this fleecing, one must note that the lessor loses both the bonus
and the correlative rights associated with owning a sought after property
when a lessee refuses to tender a lease’s bonus, including the ability to

121. See J. Zach Burt, Playing the “Wild Card” in the High-Stakes Game of Urban
Development: Unconscionability in the Early Barnett Shale Leases, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
1, 13 (2008).
122. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, at 42 (N.D. 1961).
123. See Boyer, 372 N.W.2d at 556.
124. Stanolind Oil & Gas, Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F.2d 299, 300 (9th Cir. 1938).
125. For instance, other courts have excused a delinquent bonus under the reasoning that
time is not necessarily of the essence in leases. See generally Linder v. SWEPI LP, No. 1:11-CV1579, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20827 (D. Pa. February 11, 2013); Standefer v. T. S. Dudley Land
Co., No. 3:09-CV-1115, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132267, 22 (D. Pa. July 14, 2010).
126. Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Johanneson, 153 N.W.2d 414, 420 (N.D. 1967).
127. “JB first contends the July 2009 lease is valid because a royalty clause alone is
sufficient consideration for an oil and gas lease under [Irish Oil.]” Beaudoin v. JB Mineral Servs.,
LLC, 2011 ND 229, ¶ 8, 808 N.W.2d 671, 673.
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make other arrangements for developing the leased property.128 In order to
rectify this situation through termination of the lease, a lessor must engage
in laborious and time-consuming termination efforts.
North Dakota currently provides lessors with two options in attempting
to terminate a lease. North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-36 provides
lessors with a set of procedures to terminate a lease without judicial
intervention if the lessee forfeits the lease pursuant to the lease’s terms and
the lessee fails to object to the lessor’s termination efforts.129 If
unsuccessful under this section because of the lessee’s refusal to terminate
the lease, a lessor may seek judicial termination of the lease pursuant to
North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-37,130 which allows a prevailing
lessor to terminate the lease, recover associated litigation expenses, one
hundred dollars in damages, and “any additional damages that the evidence
in the case will warrant.”131 Despite the affordance of such remedies, these
provisions are inefficient and insufficient for lessors.
This existing statutory scheme is inefficient as applied to lease disputes
because time is of the essence in leases.132 Although North Dakota Century
Code section 47-16-36 allows lessors to engage in a form of self-help
termination, the statute still requires the lessor to spend several weeks
trying to terminate the lease, and such an effort will be successful only in
the highly improbable event that the lessee fails to contest the lease’s
termination. Only then may lessors begin the protracted and uncertain
process of seeking judicial termination of the lease that could take years to
complete.133 Even if the lessor prevailed in either of these regards by
terminating the lease, market conditions may have rendered the lessor’s
property worthless in the interim, and this statutory languidness forces the
lessor to assume a great deal of economic loss.
In ascertaining these remedies’ deficiencies, one must recognize “the
measure of damages for breach of contract is the same for oil and gas leases

128. See generally Lear v. Choteau, 23 Ill. 39 (1859).
129. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (2001).
130. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-37 (1957).
131. Id. It should be noted that regular contractual damages may not be applicable in such
instances because N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-37 provides a specific remedy for this specific
instance and contractual damages are applicable “except when otherwise expressly provided by
the laws of this state.” See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-09 (1943).
132. Amber Oil and Gas Co. v. Bratton, 711 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. App. 1986).
133. Courts in western North Dakota are notoriously backlogged because of the oil boom.
See Claire Zillman, Bakken Boom Creating Constitutional Crisis for North Dakota Courts, AM.
LAW.
DAILY,
Aug.
21,
2012,
available
at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202568269279/Bakken-Boom-Creating-ConstitutionalCrisis-for-North-Dakota-Courts.
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as it is for other contracts.”134 North Dakota limits contractual damages to
the amount that will compensate an aggrieved party for the damages
proximately caused by the other party,135 and courts cannot award damages
that put the aggrieved party in a better position than if the breaching party
fully performed under the contract.136 Based upon these principles, the
lessor would be able to recover the withheld bonus because the bonus is
payable under all circumstances.137 However, the lessor would be unable to
recoup other, much more substantial damages.
Unfortunately, by executing a lease, the lessor foregoes the royalties
that may have accrued if another lessee would have developed the lessor’s
property where the original lessee refrained from doing so and the lessor
also assumes the risk that market fluctuations may render the lessor’s
property worthless before the lessor can re-lease the property. Normally,
where the lessee is under an obligation to develop the lessor’s property and
fails to do so, the appropriate damage award “is the amount of royalties that
the lessor lost by reason of the lessee’s breach,”138 and courts may also
award damages that represent “the loss in leasing value of the plaintiff’s
land resulting from the failure to drill.”139 However, as previously
discussed, the vast majority of modern leases impose no such obligation.140
Lessors would accordingly be unable to collect damages for foregone
royalties that may have accrued if another lessee developed the property
because the lessee could fully perform under the contract without providing
such royalties. Similarly, the lessor would be unable to recover for the
property’s devaluation because market fluctuations caused the depreciation,
not the lessee’s conduct.141 Accordingly, lessors could only collect lease
bonuses after market conditions rendered the lessor’s property worthless,
surely to the chagrin of lessors who sustained significant damages in
entering a lease with a lessee who was solely trying to further its own
interests by withholding the lease’s bonus.
Lessors are sure to be similarly disappointed in trying to recoup
damages pursuant to North Dakota Century Code section 47-16-37’s “any
additional damages that the evidence in the case will warrant” clause, which

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
contract.”

3 SUMMERS OIL & GAS (3d ed. 2012).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-09 (1943).
Leingang v. Mandan Weed Bd., 468 N.W.2d 397, 398 (N.D. 1991).
See Johnson v. Mineral Estate, Inc., 371 N.W.2d 136, 139-40 (N.D. 1985).
38 AM. JUR. 2d Gas & Oil § 303 (1968).
3 SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 23:8 (3d ed. 2012).
See Jones & McDowell, supra note 36 at § 23.02.
In North Dakota, “damages must flow directly and naturally from the breach of
Vallejo v. Jamestown Coll., 244 N.W.2d 753, 758 (N.D. 1976).

2013]

NOTE

701

North Dakota courts have yet to interpret or apply.142 Other comparable
statutes143 only afford damages that proximately emanate from the lessee’s
failure to cancel the lease,144 which are to be calculated based upon the
difference of the lease’s fair market value at the time the lessee should have
terminated the lease because of a contractual breach and such value at the
time of trial.145 Despite this affordance, the statute still might not make the
lessor whole because the lessor would be unable to collect damages for
devaluations that occurred while the lessee speculatively withheld the
lease’s bonus during a protracted deferral period,146 as the lessee would
technically be in compliance with the lease.147 Such a limitation is
significant because market conditions may have rendered the lessor’s
property worthless during the deferral period so that the difference in the
lease’s fair market value148 at the time the lessee should have terminated the
lease and that at the time of trial may be nominal. Thus, even though North
Dakota Century Code section 47-16-37 may provide additional damages,
lessors might still sustain significant losses in dealing with impermissibly
speculating lessees.149
Because the law cannot make lessors whole in their dealings with
speculating lessees, North Dakota’s statutory scheme is inadequate to
142. See Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Reimer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 61, 794 N.W.2d 715, 731
(VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that “[i]t remains to be determined whether [N.D. Cent.
Code § 47-16-37] will allow the recovery of the destruction of the value of the mineral estate
proven worthless while the lessee holds a lease for which the lessee has not paid the agreed-upon
bonus.”).
143. See MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 82-1-201 to 82-1-204. For other examples, see 3 SUMMERS
OIL & GAS § 19:11 (3d ed. 2012).
144. Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 225 P. 612, 614 (Mont. 1924). Such damages
cannot be used to allow the lessor “to recover more than they were actually damaged.” Reaugh v.
McCollum Exploration Co., 163 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1942). Moreover, the lessee is not liable
for a failure to discharge the lease if the lessee in good faith believed the lease to be valid. 3
SUMMERS OIL& GAS § 19:10 (3d ed. 2012).
145. Solberg v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 246 P. 168, 177 (Mont. 1926).
146. Leases will typically defer the lessee’s obligation to tender the lease’s bonus for a
specific period of time. For instance, the leases implicated in Irish Oil contained a sixty-day
deferral period. However, other leases have deferral periods of up to one hundred and eighty
days. See Linder v. SWEPI LP, No. 1:11-CV-1579, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20827 (D. Pa.
February 11, 2013).
147. In this respect, this situation is analogous to that seen in the aforementioned Range
Resources situation. See discussion, supra Part I.B.
148. In North Dakota, fair market value is “the price a buyer is willing to pay and the seller
is willing to accept under circumstances that do not amount to coercion.” Mike Golden, Inc. v.
Tenneco Oil Co., 450 N.W.2d 716, 719 (N.D. 1990) (quoting Connell v. Sun Exploration & Prod.
Co., 655 P.2d 426, 428 (Colo. App. 1982)). In this determination, fair market value is to be
determined based upon: “(1) analysis of comparable sales or market data; (2) analysis of the cost
of replacement less depreciation; and (3) an income or economic analysis.” Id.
149. It should be noted that lessors might be able to collect exemplary damages in such
instances so as to deter similar conduct in the future if the lessor can prove fraud or malice. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (2009).
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properly protect lessors. As one court observed about the oil industry,
“[p]erhaps in no other business is prompt performance of contracts so
essential to the rights of the parties, or delay by one party likely to prove so
injurious to the other.”150 In this regard, North Dakota’s laws only
exacerbate the lessor’s plight by forcing the lessor to engage in protracted
termination processes that prevent the lessors from making other
arrangements for the property. This inability to re-lease the property
because of the pending litigation only further inflicts damages that the law
cannot rectify by exposing the lessor to the risk that market conditions may
render the property worthless during the litigation. Accordingly, North
Dakota must amend the state’s lethargic laws so as to allow the lessor to
expeditiously re-lease the property. To do otherwise leaves lessors in the
unenviable position of assuming irreparable harm and allowing lessees to
walk away from a lease with minimal loss.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE FIX: STATUTORILY REQUIRED
TIMELY TENDERING OF BONUS PAYMENTS
The amalgam of these policy concerns indicates that North Dakota
needs to take some action to protect the lessor’s interest in a lease’s bonus.
The question then becomes how the state can properly effectuate this end.
In resolving this determination, North Dakota can fashion an effective
statute by considering the few existing statutes that concern the timely
tendering of lease bonuses.
As of the beginning of 2014, only two states have promulgated statutes
governing the paying of bonuses in oil and gas leases, and both statutes
leave much to be desired. A New York statute voids any lease if a lessee
fails to tender a lease’s bonus within one hundred and eighty days of the
lease’s execution.151 Although this statute properly invalidates a lease
where the lessee fails to timely tender the bonus, the statute is undesirable
because time is of the essence in leases and a one hundred and eight day
deferral period is exceedingly long. Additionally, a North Carolina statute
imposes a 10% interest rate penalty on all bonuses that remain unpaid after
sixty day following the lease’s execution.152 This statute is undesirable
because a 10% interest rate is a relatively nominal penalty153 and lessors
cannot invalidate the leases. Despite these statutory shortcomings, North
150. Munroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. 307, 311 (Pa. 1880) (emphasis added).
151. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-333(2) (McKinney 2006).
152. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-423(d) (2012).
153. For instance, North Dakota imposes an 18% interest rate penalty on all oil and gas
royalties that are outstanding following one hundred and fifty days after production. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.1 (2011).
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Dakota can adopt a statute that properly protects lessor interests and
rectifies these issue laden statutes.
In recognizing the need to revise the state’s laws to accommodate an
influx of oil and gas development, North Carolina considered various
legislative proposals concerning how to ensure the timely tendering of lease
bonuses. One of these proposals stipulated that North Carolina should
adopt a statute that automatically terminates a lease, without the need for
judicial intervention, if the lessee fails to tender the lease’s bonus within
thirty days of the lease’s execution, the lessor notifies the lessee, in writing,
of such a delinquency, and the lessee fails to rectify the situation within
fifteen days.154 North Dakota should adopt this proposal so as to forestall
Irish Oil’s operation for the forthcoming reasons.
A. PROPERLY EFFECTUATING POLICY CONCERNS
Although North Carolina refrained from codifying this proposal, the
proposal provides the best framework for North Dakota’s statute. With its
emphasis on expeditiousness and strident penalties, this proposal is much
more preferable than the North Carolina and New York statutes. This
proposal also ensures that the lessee assumes an appropriate amount of risk
in a lease’s execution, and the proposal’s automatic termination of the lease
increases the efficiency of the lessor’s legal recourse so as to minimize the
infliction of legally irreparable harm. Additionally, the proposal in no way
unduly prejudices lessees because the proposal simply codifies longstanding legal principles and leasing practices that sophisticated lessors
have used to protect their interests. In short, this proposal advances all of
the implicated policy issues and rectifies the deficiencies seen in existing
statutes while causing lessees only minimal inconvenience.
North Dakota should adopt the North Carolina proposal because such a
proposal properly remedies the New York and North Carolina statutes’
faults. The proposal is preferable to the North Carolina statute because the
statute terminates the lease instead of imposing a potentially trivial penalty,
which drastically increases the lessee’s incentive to hastily tender a lease’s
bonus. Moreover, the proposal is superior to New York’s statute because,
by allowing the lessor to promptly re-lease the property instead of waiting
one hundred and eighty days, the proposal’s short deferral period helps
protect lessors from drastic market fluctuations in the interim. The
proposal’s superiority in these respects is also keenly tailored to further the
policy concerns frustrated by Irish Oil.
154. N.C. Dep’t of Justice Consumer Protect. Div., North Carolina Oil and Gas Study under
Session Law 2011-276: Impact on Landowners and Consumer Protection Issues 42 (2012).
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By automatically terminating the lease, the proposal allows the lessor
to expeditiously re-lease the property before potential market changes may
render the lessor’s property worthless. This new lease would allow the
lessor to enjoy an additional bonus that the lessor might not be able to
collect if market conditions render the lessor’s property worthless before the
lessor can re-lease the property. The new lease would also allow the new
lessee to develop the property under prevailing market conditions. In this
regard, the proposal potentially allows the lessor to enjoy royalties that the
lessor might have to otherwise injuriously forego because a change in
market conditions might render such development uneconomical by the
time the lessor can re-lease the property. Thus, the proposal imperatively
expedites the lessor’s recourse so as to minimize the infliction of legally
incurable damages because the proposal allows lessors to circumvent
protracted and uncertain termination processes.
Additionally, by requiring the timely tendering of a bonus under the
threat of termination, the proposal ensures that the lessee assumes an
appropriate amount of risk in the lease’s execution. The required tendering
of lease bonuses mandates that the lessee assume the risk that market
conditions may render the leased property worthless so that the lessee loses
the already paid bonus. The proposal accordingly furthers the Legislature’s
previously stated desire of trying to equalize lessor-lessee relations in other
contexts155 by ensuring that both the lessor and the lessee assume risk in the
lease’s execution. In doing so, the proposal prevents lessees from
speculating with the lessor’s assets without exchanging any consideration
because the lessee must tender the bonus if the lessee wishes to hold the
lease in anticipation of market changes.156 Thus, the proposal properly
forecloses the threat that Irish Oil could allow lessees to validate a lease
while speculatively withholding the lease’s bonus,157 and the proposal
achieves this end in a way that causes lessees minimal vexation.
In mandating the timely tendering of lease bonuses, this proposal is a
tepid imposition on lessees. The proposal merely codifies the Legislature’s
possible assumption that a lease would not become operative without the
lessee’s tendering of the bonus.158 Moreover, the proposal does nothing
more than codify the well-accepted canon that time is of the essence in
155. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, at 42 (N.D. 1961).
156. In this respect the proposal furthers North Dakota’s policy of fostering and encouraging
the development of the state’s resources promulgated in N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-01 (1981) by
ensuring that only those lessees who are serious enough about developing the lessor’s property to
invest a bonus are able to hold the property for extended times.
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Riemer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 64, 794 N.W.2d 715, 732 (VandeWalle,
C.J., dissenting).
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leases159 so that a lessee’s failure to tender the bonus within the prescribed
time period precludes the lessee from asserting any rights under the lease.160
Such an imposition is consistent with how legislatures have protected
lessors because states have already gone so far as to statutory impose Pugh
clauses161 and minimal royalty interests162 into leases. Although such
protection may cause lessees some mild trepidation,163 the proposal
adequately protects lessees who make a sincere mistake about failing to
tender the lease’s bonus because the proposal requires that the lessor notify
the lessee of the delinquent bonus and affords the lessee fifteen additional
days to tender the bonus before the lease terminates. In short, this proposal
is merely a modest protectionist measure designed to protect lessors,
specifically unsophisticated lessors.
Sophisticated lessors, usually with the attorney assistance, have already
recognized the efficacy of including provisions similar to this proposal. For
instance, seasoned lessors have included language to the effect that the
implicated lease shall be null and void unless the bonus consideration is
paid by a specified date.164 However, lay lessors will most likely be unable
to appreciate how the failure to include a similar provision can cause a
situation like that found in Irish Oil. Rather, the prospect of newfound
wealth often causes unsophisticated lessors to overlook that lessees are
trying to further their own interests in negotiating leases.165 Such a
realization provides further fodder for codifying this proposal because the
proposal properly protects the most vulnerable lessors, as indicated by the
proposal’s potential applications.
One can immediately recognize the proposal’s virtue by applying it to
the aforementioned instances of questionable lessee conduct.166 The
proposal would have prevented Range Resources from terminating leases
without the loss of previously paid bonuses by requiring the full tendering
159. Amber Oil & Gas Co. v. Bratton, 711 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
160. E.E.E., Inc. v. Hanson, 318 N.W.2d 101, 104 (N.D. 1982).
161. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-09.8 (1983); ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-73-201(a) (2011);
OKLA. STAT. TIT. 52, § 87.1(b) (2012).
162. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-423(c) (2012) (“Any lease of oil or gas rights . . . shall provide
that the lessor shall receive a royalty payment of not less than twelve and one-half percent
(12.5%) . . . .”).
163. One can certainly argue that this proposal is unduly burdensome on lessees because the
shortened deferral period may be insufficient time for the lessee to conduct a title search and cure
any potential defects. Given that protecting lessors is of the utmost importance, such an argument
is unavailing because the proposal may simply require that the lessees complete these and other
tasks before entering the lease with the lessor.
164. Johnson v. Mineral Estate, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 778, 779 (N.D. 1984).
165. See Joshua A. Swanson, The Fine Print Matters: Negotiating Oil and Gas Leases in
North Dakota, 87 N.D. L. REV. 703, 706 (2012).
166. See discussion, supra Part I.B.
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of the lease bonuses within a reasonable time frame; if Range Resources
refused to do so, the leases would have terminated, and the lessors could
have re-leased the property before market conditions deteriorated. The
proposal also would have terminated the leases with Chesapeake Energy
before drilling results presumably rendered the implicated area worthless,
which would have allowed the lessors to gain the benefits of another lease
before the new lessee found the implicated area unsuitable for production.
Furthermore, by requiring the full tendering of a lease’s bonus within the
specific time frame, the proposal prevents lessees from refusing to tender a
bonus’s outstanding balance after the lessee fails to find a buyer for the
lease. Finally, the proposal would have prevented Irish Oil from validating
its lease with the Riemers after failing to tender the leases’ bonuses because
the proposal would have automatically terminated the leases if the Riemers
complied with the proposal’s various requirements. Thus, the proposal will
duly protect lessor interests by preventing similar situations in the future.
B. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE FIX
Based upon the foregoing reasons, North Dakota should adopt the
following proposal: In order to protect lessor interests through mandating
the prompt, full payment of all lease bonuses and to prevent impermissible
speculation on the part of lessees, an oil and gas lease containing a bonus
shall automatically terminate if the lessee fails to tender the lease’s bonus
within thirty days of the lease’s execution, the lessor subsequently notifies
the lessee, in writing, of such a delinquency, and the lessee fails to redress
the situation within fifteen additional days.167
V. CONTRACTING AROUND IRISH OIL IN THE INTERIM
While Irish Oil persists and the Legislature’s failure to act on Irish Oil
during the 2013 legislative session constitutes a tacit endorsement of Irish
Oil’s constructions of law,168 the question that arises is whether lessors can
contract around Irish Oil. As previously alluded to,169 lessors can use
various methods to protect themselves from speculating lessees.
Specifically, lessors can prevent Irish Oil’s operation by making the timely

167. This is not intended to be the full extent of the potential statute because the potential
statute must address issues such as how the written notification is to occur, when and how the
lessor is to file a satisfaction of the lease with county recorders, and other formalities.
168. Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663, 666 (N.D.1995) (The court “presume[s] the
legislature is aware of judicial construction of a statute, and from its failure to amend a particular
statutory provision, we may presume it acquiesces in that construction.”).
169. See discussion, supra Part IV.A.
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tendering of a lease’s bonus a condition precedent to the lease’s formation
or by pairing the lease’s bonus with an “unless” clause.
Lessors can usurp Irish Oil by making the lessee’s tendering of the
bonus a condition precedent to the lease’s formation. When the parties
agree to a condition precedent, no binding contract exists before the parties
satisfy the condition.170 As applied within oil and gas leases, precedent
conditions must be literally performed171 so that a failure to honor a sight
draft within a prescribed time period warrants cancellation of the lease
where honoring the draft was a condition precedent to the lease’s
validation.172 Accordingly, lessors can prevent Irish Oil’s potentially
draconian results by making the timely tendering of the lease’s bonus a
condition precedent. This result can be achieved by including the following
language: The full and actual payment of the lease’s bonus shall be the
only form of consideration acceptable to create a valid lease. The promise
or expectation to pay production royalties under the lease shall not be considered
as any form of consideration, including executory consideration, to create a valid
lease between the parties. If such bonus payment is not made to lessor by [a
specified date], it shall be considered a total failure of consideration and there
shall be no valid lease or contract.
Similarly, yet slightly different,173 lessors can contract around Irish Oil
by pairing a lease’s bonus with an “unless” clause. In Beaudoin v. JB
Mineral Services, LLC,174 the North Dakota Supreme Court refused to
extend Irish Oil to situations involving “unless” clauses.175 With such a
lease, the lease automatically terminates where the lease provides that the
lease shall terminate unless the lessee tenders the lease’s consideration by a
specific date and the lessee fails to do so. Accordingly, lessors can prevent
Irish Oil’s operation by including a provision that stipulates that the lease
will be null and void unless the lessee tenders the lease’s bonus within a
specific time period, which would have the same practical effect as this
article’s proposal. Thus, although Irish Oil continues to threaten lessor

170. Airport Inn Enter., Inc. v. Ramage, 2004 ND 92, ¶ 11, 679 N.W.2d 269, 272.
171. Paraffine Oil Co. v. Cruce, 162 P. 716, 722 (Okla. 1916).
172. Clawson v. Berklund, 610 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Mont. 1980).
173. Although similar to precedent conditions, “unless” clauses are inherently
distinguishable. With condition’s precedent, no contract exists if the condition precedent is
unsatisfied. Airport Inn Enterprises, 2004 ND ¶ 11, 679 N.W.2d at 272. Contrastingly, an unless
clause invalidates an already existing contract based upon a parties’ failure to perform a particular
action. See Norman Jessen & Assoc., Inc. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 305 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D.
1981).
174. 2011 ND 229, 808 N.W.2d 672.
175. Id. ¶ 11, 808 N.W.2d at 674
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interests, lessors can still protect their interests by including simple
provisions that emphasize the importance of lease bonuses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bakken oil boom is an economic godsend for North Dakota that
continues to present daunting and unprecedented challenges. Using
hindsight from past booms and busts, public officials have mitigated some
of the boom’s consequences. However, these officials have yet to
recognize that North Dakota’s current statutory scheme allows lessees to
take advantage of unassuming lessors through the use of legal technicalities
that frustrate numerous policy aims, as indicated by Irish Oil. These
unpalatable results are precisely why protection of lessor interests must
remain of the utmost importance.176 In order to effectuate this end, North
Dakota must adopt a statute that automatically terminates a lease, without
the need for judicial intervention, if a lessee fails to tender a lease’s bonus
with thirty days of the lease’s execution, the lessor subsequently notifies the
lessee, in writing, of such a delinquency, and the lessee fails to redress the
situation within fifteen additional days. To do otherwise leads to decisions,
such as Irish Oil, that are a “disservice to those lessors who may have their
mineral estate found worthless and receive no bonus.”177
Zachary R. Eiken*

176. Moerman v. Prairie Rose Res., Inc. 308 P.3d 75, 79 (Mont. 2013).
177. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Reimer, 2011 ND 22, ¶ 63, 794 N.W.2d 715, 731 (VandeWalle,
C.J., dissenting).
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